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BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF LAW
Cass R. Sunstein*
The future of economic analysis of law lies in new and better
understandings of decision and choice.1
In the last two decades, social scientists have learned a great deal
about how people actually make decisions.2 Much of this work
requires qualifications of rational choice models.3 Those models are
often wrong in the simple sense that they yield inaccurate predictions. Cognitive errors and motivational distortions may press
behavior far from the anticipated directions; normative accounts of
rational choice should not be confused with descriptive accounts.4
But it does not follow that people’s behavior is unpredictable, sys* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Dan Kahan,
Martha Nussbaum, Richard Pildes, Richard Posner, and Richard Thaler for valuable
comments, and especially to Thaler and Daniel Kahneman for helpful discussions
of many relevant topics; none of the aforementioned people is responsible for mistakes and misconceptions. Some of the ideas developed here are discussed in more
detail in Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(forthcoming); Thaler, Jolls, and Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics
(forthcoming).
1 These models sometimes go under the name of behavioral research or behavioral decision theory.
2 I draw here on R. Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1994); Conlisk, Why
Bounded Rationality?, 34 J Ec Literature 669 (1996). A useful collection is
Environment, Ethics, and Behavior (M. Bazerman et al., eds., 1997).
3 There is of course much controversy in specifying what rational choice models require. Some of the evidence I discuss shows how people react to the presence
of decision costs, and it is far from irrational to take those costs into account. And
it may be fully rational to consider the effects of social norms on choice, since
norm-violations can count as costs. It is far less important to struggle over the
question whether the evidence shows violations of “rationality” than to be as clear
as possible on how human beings actually behave; it is the latter issue that I am
concerned with here.
4 This is a prominent theme in the work of Amos Tversky, taking “normative
accounts” to refer to certain aspects of expected utility theory; Tversky’s emphasis
here is on cognitive errors. See, e.g., Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and
Constructive Choice, in Kenneth Arrow et al., eds., The Rational Foundations of
Economic Behavior (1996).
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tematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists.
On the contrary, the qualifications can be described, used, and
sometimes even modeled. Those qualifications, and the resulting
understandings of decision and choice,5 are playing a large and
mounting role in many fields within economics and other social
sciences.
Oddly, the relevant research has yet to find a significant place in
the economic analysis of law.6 An enormous gap remains to be
filled. The gap is especially important for economic analysis of law,
which is concerned in significant part with nonmarket behavior. It
is here that deviations from the conventional model are—it is generally conceded—most likely to occur.7
Much behavioral work suggests that preferences and values are
sometimes constructed rather than elicited by social situations.8
“[O]bserved preferences are not simply read off some master list; they
are actually constructed during the elicitation process. . . . Different
elicitation procedures highlight different aspects of options and
suggest alternative heuristics, which give rise to inconsistent
5 See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 4 Econometrica 263 (1979); Loomes & Sugden, Regret Theory,
92 Econ. J. 805 (1982).
6 Much of the relevant research involves experiments and survey data, and
hence it is possible to question whether the findings apply to the real world. And
there is of course a possibility that experiments, particularly in the form of
answers to questionnaires, are imperfect predicators of actual behavior. By this
stage, however, there is adequate basis to conclude that the findings I describe are
replicated in the real world; in fact many of them are based on real world evidence.
See, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Polit Econ 1325 (1990) (cataloguing evidence
from experimental and real world settings). On the general topic, see Colin
Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in The Handbook of Experimental
Economics 587 (J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds., 1995); Thaler, The Psychology and
Economics Conference Handbook, in Quasi-Rational Economics 189 (1993).
7See the revealing remarks to this effect in Shogren & Hayes, Reply, 87
American Economic Review 241, 243 (1997) (criticizing general claims about
endowment effects but acknowledging their importance in nonmarket settings).
8See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 Am. Psych. 364
(1995); Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in Kenneth
Arrow et al., eds., The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior (1996).
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responses.”9 People do not generally consult a freestanding
“preference menu” from which selections are made at the moment
of choice; preferences can be a product of procedure, description, and
context at the time of choice. “Alternative descriptions of the same
choice problems lead to systematically different preferences; strategically equivalent elicitation procedures give rise to different choices;
and the preference between x and y often depends on the choice set
within which they are embedded.”10 What has been learned about
human behavior and choice should be linked, at the theoretical and
empirical levels, with analysis of the legal system.
This is so especially because the legal system is pervasively in the
business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts for
choice. Of course the legal system creates procedures, descriptions,
and contexts in the course of litigated cases. For example, the alternatives (selected to be) placed before the jury or judge may matter a
great deal; liability or conviction on some count A may very much
depend on the nature of counts B, C, and D.11 In this respect the
preferences and values of judges and juries may well be constructed,
not elicited, by the legal system. Certainly this is true for the award
of damages, where special problems may arise.12 But similar points
hold outside of the courtroom. The allocation of legal entitlements,
and the structures created for exchange (or nonexchange) by law,
may well affect both preferences and values. Thus law can construct
rather than elicit preferences internally, by affecting what goes on in
court, and externally, by affecting what happens in ordinary transactions, market and nonmarket.
For purposes of analysis we might distinguish among three
different tasks: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive work is
of course concerned with predictions. If, contrary to conventional
assumptions, people dislike losses far more than they like equivalent
gains, predictions will go wrong insofar as they rest on conventional
assumptions. As we will shortly see, this point has important impli9

Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 Psych.
Rev. 371, 371 (1988).
10 Tversky, supra note 4, at 186.
11See below.
12 See below.
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cations for positive analysis of law, prominently including the Coase
theorem.
Prescriptive work is concerned with showing how society might
actually reach shared goals; this is a central purpose of economic
analysis of law. Consider the following information campaigns,
which conventional analysis deems equivalent. (a) If you use energy
conservation methods, you will save $X per year. (b) If you do not
use energy conservation methods, you will lose $X per year. It turns
out that information campaign (b) is far more effective than information campaign (a).13 Some features of human judgment, properly
understood, undermine conventional economic prescriptions about
what will work best; they help explain, to take just one example,
precisely why the public service advertising slogan “drive defensively;
watch out for the other guy” is particularly ingenious.
Normative work is of course concerned with what the legal system should do. Recent revisions in understanding human behavior
greatly unsettle certain arguments against paternalism in law. They
certainly do not make an affirmative case for paternalism; but they
support a form of anti-antipaternalism. If, for example, people use
heuristic devices that lead to systematic errors, their judgments about
how to deal with risks may be badly misconceived.14 If people are
unrealistically optimistic, they may run risks because of a factually
false belief in their own relative immunity from harm, even if they
are fully aware of the statistical facts. And if people’s choices are
based on incorrect judgments about their experience after choice,
there is reason to question whether respect for choices, rooted in
those incorrect judgments, is a good way to promote utility or welfare. None of these points makes a firm case for legal paternalism,
not least because bureaucrats may be subject to the same cognitive
and motivational distortions as everyone else.15 But they suggest that
objections to paternalism should be more empirical and pragmatic,
having to do with the possibility of education and likely failures of
government response, rather than a priori in nature.
13
14

See E. Aronson, The Social Animal 124-25 (6th ed. 1996).
Thus the literature on heuristics and biases helps support the analysis in S.
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1993) (favoring technocratic assessments of
risk).
15See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs 138-46 (1993).
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Now let me offer a few details, tracing some of the principal
findings16 that emerge from behavioral research, and showing how
they bear on positive, prescriptive, and normative work in law.17
1. Loss aversion.
People are especially averse to losses.18 They are more displeased
with losses than they are pleased with equivalent gains—roughly
16

The discussion is illustrative, not exhaustive. Other examples are plentiful.
For example, people appear not to ignore sunk costs. See Thaler, supra note 2, at
11-13, 148-49. This point bears on predictions about the behavior of contracting
parties. Nor do I provide an exhaustive discussion of framing effects. For example,
if it is said, of 400 people who undergo a certain operation, 350 are alive after five
years, many more people will undergo the operation than if they are told, of 400
people who undergo an operation, 50 are dead after five years. See Redelmeier et
al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993). People also
make different judgments of probability after different descriptions of the same
problem, partly because a description that stresses the components of a category
(how likely is it that X will die from cancer, heart disease, or other natural causes?)
produces higher numbers than one that refers to the category itself (how likely is it
that X will die from natural causes?). See Tversky and Koehler, Support Theory,
101 Psych Rev 547 (1994). There is also a recent finding of a “focusing illusion,”
by which people, focusing on a component of well-being, think that it is far more
important to well-being than it is in fact. See Kahneman and Schkade, Would You
Be Happier In California? (unpublished manuscript, 1997). See also R. Thaler,
The Winner’s Curse (1994), for an instructive collection.
17 An interesting question is whether these various effects vary across cultures
and (relatedly) whether they might be changed through education. There is evidence
that loss aversion can be found in a range of cultures, and also that the results of
the ultimatum game are not culturally variant, see Thaler and Camerer, Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners, 9 J Econ Persp. 209 (1995); The Handbook of
Experimental Economics 282-88. But this is at most a start.
Of special interest is the fact that pigeons and rats appear to behave in accordance with prospect theory rather than expected utility theory! See Kagel, Battalio,
Green, Economic Choice Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior
162-67 (1995).
There is also the general question whether some or all of these effects might
be changed through information and education.
18 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Polit Econ 1325 (1990); R. Thaler, QuasiRational Economics, supra note 2; The Handbook of Experimental Economics
665-70 (John Kagel and Alvin Roth, eds., 1995). Loss aversion is an aspect of
prospect theory. See Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 5. On policy implica-

6

CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW & ECONOMICS

speaking, twice as displeased. Contrary to economic theory, people
do not treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs as if they
were equivalent.
Loss aversion has important implications for positive analysis of
law. It means, for example, that the Coase theorem is in one respect
quite wrong.19 The theorem is wrong because the allocation of the
legal entitlement may well matter in the sense that those who are
initially allocated an entitlement are likely to value it more than
those without the legal entitlement. Thus workers allocated a
(waivable) right to be discharged only for cause may well value that
right far more than they would be if employers were allocated a
(tradeable) right to discharge at will; thus breathers of air may well
value their (tradeable) right to be free from air pollution far more
than they would be if polluters had been given a (tradeable) right to
emit polluting substances into the air. The legal entitlement creates
an endowment effect, that is, a greater valuation stemming from the
mere fact of endowment. This effect has been observed in many
contexts.20
There is a further point. People are averse to losses, but whether
an event “codes” as a loss or a gain depends not on simple facts but
on a range of contextual factors, including how the event is framed.
The status quo is usually the reference point, so that losses are
understood as such by reference to existing distributions and
practices;21 but it is possible to manipulate the frame so as to make a
tions, see Knetsch, Reference Status, Fairness, and Choice of Measure to Value
Environmental Changes, in Environment, Ethics, and Behavior, supra note 2.
19 Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Polit Econ 1325 (1990). The
Coase theorem remains correct insofar as it says that the allocation of the
entitlement will not (under the stated conditions) affect efficiency.
20See id.; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, in Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (1997).
21See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty 7
(1988). Note in this respect the phenomenon of “commission bias”—people would
much prefer to make an error of omission than one of commission, even in the
context of vaccinating their children, where commission bias can greatly increase
risks to children. See Ritov and Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate, 3 J of Behavioral
Decision Making 263 (1991). Compare the finding that the status quo becomes
more attractive when there are two alternatives to it rather than one. Thus doctors,
policymakers, and ordinary people, in situations of choice, may be ambivalent
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change code as a loss rather than a gain, or vice-versa. Consider a
company that says “cash discount” rather than “credit card
surcharge”; or a parent who says that for behavior X (rather than
behavior Y) a child will be rewarded, as opposed to saying that for
behavior Y (rather than for behavior X) a child will be punished;22
or familiar advertisements to the effect that “you cannot afford not
to” use a certain product. In environmental regulation, it is possible
to manipulate the reference point by insisting that policymakers are
trying to “restore” water or air quality to its state at time X; the
restoration time matters a great deal to people’s choices.23
For present purposes, the most important source of reference
point is the law—where has the legal system placed the initial
entitlement? Much research remains to be done on the effects of
this initial allocation. It bears, for example, on the distinction
between “subsidies” and “penalties” that has proved so crucial to the
law governing unconstitutional conditions;24 that distinction can be
understood as responsive to the phenomenon of loss aversion, and
framing effects very much affect different judgments about whether
someone has been subsidized or instead penalized.25
Loss aversion also raises serious questions about the goal of the
tort system. Should damages measure the amount that would restore
an injured party to the status quo ante, or should they reflect the
amount that an injured party would demand to be subject to the
injury before the fact? Juries appear to believe that the amount that
would be demanded pre-injury is far greater than the amount that
would restore the status quo ante.26 The legal system appears
between a status quo option (stay home and study tonight, prescribe the ordinary
course of treatment, do not depart from existing policy) and a single option; the
introduction of a new alternative makes the status quo more appealing. See Shafir
and Tversky, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision, 3
Psych. Sci. 358 (1992).
22 Personal experience suggests that this works!
23See Gregory et al., The Role of Past States in Determining Reference
Points for Policy Decisions, 55 Org. Behavior and Human Decision Processes 195
(1993).
24 See Stone et al., Constitutional Law 1757-1764 (3d ed. 1996).
25See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980).
26See McCaffery, Spitzer, and Kahneman, Framing the Jury, 81 Va L Rev
1341 (1995).
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generally to see the compensation question as the latter one, though
it does not seem to have made this choice in any systematic way.
The disparity has large implications for the choice between
liability rules and property rules. Property rules allow a taking only
via “willingness to accept”; liability rules frame the question in terms
of “willingness to pay.” The economic literature on the choice
between the two generally does not recognize that the resulting
valuations may be dramatically different.27
2. Extremeness aversion.
People are averse to extremes. Whether an option is extreme
depends on the stated alternatives. Extremeness aversion gives rise to
compromise effects. As between given alternatives, people seek a compromise. In this as in other respects, the framing of choice matters;
the introduction of (unchosen, apparently irrelevant) alternatives
into the frame can alter the outcome. When, for example, people are
choosing between some small radio A and a mid-size radio B, most
may well choose A; but the introduction of a third, large radio C is
likely to lead many people to choose B instead.28 Thus the introduction of a third, unchosen (and in that sense irrelevant) option may
produce a switch in choice as between two options. Almost everyone
has had an experience of switching to (say) the second most
expensive item on some menu of options, and of doing so partly
because of the presence of the very most expensive item.29
Extremeness aversion suggests that a simple axiom of conventional economic theory—involving the irrelevance of added,
unchosen alternatives—is wrong.30 It also has large consequences
for legal advocacy and judgment, as well as for predictions about the
effects of law. How can a preferred option best be framed as the
“compromise” choice? When should a lawyer argue in the alterna27See, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, Property Rules and Liability Rules, 109
Harv L Rev 713 (1996).
28 See Kelman, Rottenstreich, and Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decisionmaking, 25 J. Legal Stud. 287 (1996).
29 Compare the phenomenon of “tradeoff contrast”: the introduction of a third
alternative may make some characteristic of the choice especially salient and thus
affect judgment. See id.
30See Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 Econometrica 495
(1993).
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tive, and what kinds of alternative arguments are most effective?
This should be a central question for advocates to answer. Juries and
judges may will try to choose a compromise solution, and what
“codes” as the compromise solution depends on what alternatives are
made available. And in elections, medical interventions, and policymaking, compromise effects may matter a great deal.
3. Self-serving bias, unrealistic optimism, and overconfidence.
People’s judgments about fairness are self-serving, and people
tend to be both unrealistically optimistic and overconfident about
their judgments.31 In any random couple, it is highly likely that
addition of answers to the question, “what percentage of the
domestic work do you do?,” will produce a number greater than
100%. The point bears on the otherwise largely inexplicable
phenomenon of bargaining impasses. Why don’t more cases settle?
Why does the legal system spend so much on dispute settlement?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that self-serving bias—a belief that
one deserves more than other people tend to think—affects both
parties to a negotiation, and this makes agreement very difficult.32
Unrealistic optimism and self-serving bias also bear on individual
risk-bearing, and hence on the role of the regulatory state, especially
in the area of dangers to life and health. Even factually informed
people tend to think that risks are less likely to materialize for
themselves than for others. Thus there is systematic overconfidence
in risk judgments, as the vast majority of people believe that they are
less likely than other people to be subject to automobile accidents,
infection from AIDS, heart attacks, asthma, and many other health
risks.33 In one survey, for example, 90% of automobile drivers
considered themselves to be above-average drivers.34 In another
survey, students asked to envision their future said that they were far
31See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds.
1995).
32 See Kahneman and Tversky, supra note, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution;
Babcock & Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving
Biases, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 109 (1997)
33 See Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 Science 1232
(1989).
34 S. Taylor, Positive Illusions 10-11(1990).
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less likely than their classmates to be fired from a job, to have a heart
attack or to get cancer, to be divorced after a few years of marriage,
or to have a drinking problem.35
Reflecting illusions about their own practices, gay men appear
systematically to underestimate the chance that they will get AIDS,
even though they do not lack information about AIDS risks in
general.36 Older people similarly underestimate the likelihood that
they will be in a car accident or contract major diseases. Unrealistic
optimism appears to characterize people in most social categories.37
People systematically underestimate the extent to which they are at
risk, and perceptions of relative invulnerability affect preventive
health practices.38 A random community-wide survey of attitudes
toward health risks founded systematic belief of above-average
immunity from risk.39
Unrealistic optimistic and self-serving bias are relevant to the
positive and prescriptive tasks of law. Efforts to educate people about
risk may run afoul of unrealistic optimism; hence mere statistical
knowledge may fail to produce adequate information. Moreover,
efforts to increase consensual solutions must take account of selfserving bias; problems with negotiated rulemaking, one of the most
popular new developments in administrative law, may have selfserving bias at their roots. Unrealistic optimism also creates a
distinctive problem for conventional objections to paternalism in
law. If people tend to believe that they are relatively free from risks,
they may lack accurate information even if they know statistical
facts. Moreover, such evidence much complicates the widespread
view that people often overstate low-probability events. It is true
that people may think that low probability events have higher probability than they in fact do. But many individual agents think that
they are peculiarly immune from such events, which may mean that
they err in the other direction.
35
36

Id. at 33.
Bauman and Siegel, Misperception Among Gay Men of the Risk for AIDS
Associated With Their Sexual Behavior, 17 J Applied Social Psychology 329
(1987).
37 Id.
38 Bauman and Siegel at 330-331.
39 See Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health
Problems, 10 J Behavioral Medicine 481 (1986).
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4. Decision utility vs. experience utility.
In economics it is often assumed that the utility of experience is
best measured by the anticipated utility shown by people’s decisions.
But a good deal of recent research40 shows that there may well be
systematic differences between the utility expected at the time of
decision and the utility actually experienced as a result of decision.
People’s judgments about their experience at the time of decision
can be mistaken, in the sense that they have a hard time assessing
what the experience will actually be like.
There are many examples. From the phenomenon of loss aversion we can infer that people value goods more when they own
them than when they do not. This effect—the endowment
effect—has been observed in many settings.41 But in recent
experiments, people have been unable to predict the endowment
effect, and thus unable to predict their own tastes.42 This finding is
paralleled by many studies showing that people do not accurately
predict the consequences of (for example) winning the lottery and
becoming paraplegic. (Winning the lottery produces much lower
hedonic gains than expected, and people adjust to becoming paraplegic much more easily than expected.) An especially important
example comes from studies dealing with HIV testing. People are
quite terrified of their reaction if they find that they are HIVpositive; they predict a high degree of panic and depression. But a
recent study suggests that people are able to adapt fairly well to the
bad news, and their panic and depression are far less severe than they
thought ex ante.43 We might expect that people would therefore
“undertest”; they are likely to be especially averse to undergoing a
process of which they are very fearful. It might follow that regula40 See Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in The
Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior 203 (Arrow et al. eds. 1996);
Loewenstein and Schkade, note 42 infra.
41See Thaler, supra note 2.
42See George Lowenstein and David Schkade. Wouldn’t it be nice? Predicting
tastes and feelings. To appear in E. Diener, N. Schwartz, & D. Kahneman (Eds.).
Hedonic Psychology: Scientific Approaches to Enjoyment, Suffering, and Wellbeing. Russell Sage Foundation.
43See Elaine Sieff, Robyn Dawes, and George Loewenstein, Anticipated Versus Actual Reaction to HIV Test Results, forthcoming Am. J. of Psych. (1997).
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tory approaches—education, persuasion, financial incentives,
conceivably coercion—would make a good deal of sense.
Economists have urged that people have adequate information
about the risks of smoking and that additional regulation is therefore
inappropriate.44 And it does seem that people know many of the
basic “facts.” But a study of high school students suggests a problem.45 About one-third of adolescent smokers believed that there
was no risk from smoking a pack of cigarettes daily for the first years
after starting to smoke. Young people who smoke believe that they
are personally at below average risk from smoking. And 85% of high
school teenagers who smoked occasionally believed that they would
not be smoking in five years, whereas a follow-up study showed that
only 58% had quit and 37% had actually increased their
consumption. About 32% of those who smoked one pack believed
that they would quit in five years, but only 13% did in fact.
When people’s decision mispredict their experience, a common
argument against paternalism—to the effect that ordinary people
choose what will promote their welfare—is no longer plausible.
Perhaps it will ultimately be possible to be systematic about issues of
this kind—to know when, exactly, people’s decisions produce bad
experiences.
5. Cooperation, fairness, and the appearance of fairness.
Economists sometimes assume that people are self-interested.
This may well be true, and often it is a useful simplifying assumption. But people also may want to act fairly and, equally important,
they want to be seen to act fairly, especially but not only among
nonstrangers. For purposes of understanding law, what is especially
important is that people may sacrifice their economic self-interest in
order to be, or to appear, fair.
Consider, for example, the ultimatum game.46 The people who
run the game give some money, on a provisional basis, to the first of
two players. The first player is instructed to offer some part of the
money to the second player. If the second player accepts that
44See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking (1993).
45 See Paul Slovic, What Does It Mean To
46See The Handbook of Experimental

discussion.

Know A Risk? (forthcoming).
Economics 282-88 for general
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amount, he can keep what is offered, and the first player gets to keep
the rest. But if the second player rejects the offer, neither player gets
anything. Both players are informed that these are the rules. No
bargaining is allowed. Using standard assumptions about rationality,
self-interest, and choice, economists predict that the first player
should offer a penny and the second player should accept. But this is
not what happens. Offers usually average between 30% and 40% of
the total. Offers of less than 20% are often rejected. Often there is a
50-50 division. These results cut across the level of the stakes and
also across diverse cultures.
The results of the ultimatum game are highly suggestive. Perhaps people will not violate norms of fairness, even when doing so is
in their economic self-interest, at least if the norm-violations would
be public. What offers are made in bankruptcy negotiations? Do
companies always raise prices when circumstances create short-term
scarcity? For example, are there social constraints on price increases
for snow shovels after a snowstorm, or for umbrellas during a
rainstorm? It may well be that contracting parties are reluctant to
take advantage of the misfortunes of another, partly because of social
constraints on self-interested behavior. Here there is much room for
future work. Experimental work also shows a high degree of
cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma situations, especially when people
are speaking with one another.47
6. Heuristics and biases.
People make judgments about probability on the basis of heuristic devices, responsive perhaps to high costs of inquiry and decision,
that may often work well in many cases but that tend also to lead to
systematic errors.48 This work bears on the demand for (and hence
also the supply of) government services, including regulation. It also
has implications for assessment of the jury system—suggesting that
juries are likely to make many mistakes in terms of probability
assessments and that correction of those mistakes is a large task of
the legal system. Here is a very brief description of several heuristics
of particular relevance to law.
47
48

See The Handbook of Experimental Economics 111-173, for an overview.
See id at 590-616.
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a. Availability.
People tend to think that risks are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or “available.”49 If pervasive, the
availability heuristic will produce systematic errors. Assessments of
risk will be pervasively biased, in the sense that people will think that
some risks (of a nuclear accident, for example) are high, whereas
others (of a stroke, for example) are relatively low. “Availability cascades” can produce a large demand for law, as in the familiar
“pollutant of the month” syndrome in environmental law. We lack a
firm understanding of how availability cascades occur and of how
institutions might be designed to produce appropriate responses.50
b. Anchoring.
Often people make probability judgments on the basis of an initial value, or “anchor,” for which they make insufficient
adjustments.51 The initial value may have an arbitrary or irrational
source. When this is so, the probability assessment may go badly
wrong. This point bears on jury deliberations reconstructing the
facts; it also suggests possible problems with damage determinations,
for example in the case of punitive damages, where arbitrary anchors
may loom large.
c. Representativeness.
Judgments about probability are in large part judgments about
whether some process A will bring about some event B. Under what
circumstances will driving produce significant increases in air pollution, or fatal accidents? When will airbags produce risks to children?
Do disposable diapers cause pollution problems? In answering such
questions, people ask about the extent to which A is representative of
B in the sense that it resembles B. Thus people tend to be insensitive
to sample size, misunderstand the phenomenon of regression to the
mean, have excessive confidence in their own judgments, and
misunderstand the effect on probability of base-rate frequency.52 As
49See

Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 5; W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal
Tradeoffs (1992).
50Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (work in progress), is an effort to deal with these issues.
51 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 5.
52 Id.
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a result, people may systematically misunderstand risk levels. Risk
regulation in general and in particular cases may go awry.
d. Case-based decision theory.
Heuristic devices are often used when the costs of deliberation
are high; in such cases, second-order decisions, operating as default
rules, can make particularized assessments less necessary. An important way of reducing decision costs is to make assessments on the
basis of previous cases rather than through calculation of relevant
costs and benefits.53 In fact people often reason to calling to mind
particular cases and seeing how the problem at hand compares with
those cases; this can be an important method of reducing decision
costs.54 The emphasis on case-based decisions, as a way of minimizing decision costs while producing acceptably low error costs, has
significant consequences for the understanding of law. Of course
adjudication is a form of case-based reasoning, and we may be able
better to understand its nature, and its vices and virtues, if we see it
as an alternative both to expected utility theory and to rule-bound
decision, and as emerging from the distinctive institutional
characteristics of judicial institutions.55
7. Probability-related “tastes.”
Here we are dealing not with simple factual errors, but with
“tastes” or preferences that lead people to favor certain approaches to
risk. Probability-related tastes present harder questions for the policy
analyst. These tastes matter to law insofar as they bear on the demand for legal regulation and insofar as they are highly likely to
affect judgments of both juries and courts.
a. “All or nothing.”
People do not weight probabilities in a linear fashion. Most important, they greatly prefer the elimination of a risk over the
diminution of a risk. Thus it appears that people would much rather
53

Gilboa and Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, 110 Q J Econ 605

(1995)
54 See Gilboa and Schmeidler, Case-Based Decision Theory, 110 Q. J. Econ.
605 (1995).
55 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
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see a risk of .001 reduced to zero than a risk of .002 reduced to
.001.56 It is not clear whether this preference should be characterized as irrational. Perhaps people receive a great deal of peace of
mind from an eliminated risk, and a risk of reduced probability still
creates residual fear. The point appears to be reflected in law. Thus
the Clean Air Act speaks in terms of ensuring safe levels of air
quality, admittedly a highly misleading way to set up the problem.
b. Ambiguity aversion.
A closely related “taste” is the avoidance of ambiguity.57 At least
when they lack relevant knowledge, and know that they do, people
prefer situations of uncertainty (in which probabilities can be
assigned to outcomes) over situations of risk (in which probabilities
cannot be assigned). Thus people are averse to situations of uncertain probability and try to avoid choices that place them in such
situations. Often risk regulation is, of course, undertaken when
probabilities cannot be assigned. If people are averse to ambiguities,
they may produce an incoherent pattern of regulation, perhaps based
on an illusory perception, related to all-or-nothing judgments, that
some things are “safe” and others are “dangerous.”
c. Status quo bias.
As noted, people evaluate situations largely in accordance with
their relation to a certain reference point; gains and losses from the
reference point are crucial. An ordinary reference is the status quo,
which produces status quo bias. The legal system is certainly responsive to this kind of bias.58
8. Mental accounting.
A simple and apparently uncontroversial assumption of most
economists is that money is fungible. But the assumption is false.59
Money comes in compartments. People create “frames” that result in
mental accounts through which losses and gains, including losses
56

See Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions, 270 JAMA 72,
73 (1993).
57 See Fox and Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance,
110 Q J Ec 585 (1995).
58See Sunstein, supra note 20 for examples.
59See R. Thaler, in Quasi-Rational Economics, supra note 2; see also Viviana
Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (1994).
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and gains in simple monetary terms, are not fungible with each
other. A glance at ordinary practice shows that people often organize decisions in terms of separate budgets and accounts. Thus some
money is for retirement; some is for vacation; some is for college
tuition; some is for mortgage or rental payments. Mental accounting
is an important aspect of financial self-control.
The practice of mental accounting has a range of implications
for law and policy. It suggests, for example, that government may be
able to create certain mental accounts by creative policymaking. And
it suggests that there may be a demand for publicly created mental
accounts, perhaps as a self-control strategy, as for example with
Social Security and other programs with an apparent paternalistic
dimension. Some statutes that appear to prevent people from
making choices as they wish may be best understood as responsive to
the widespread desire to have separate mental accounts. Of course
there are private mechanisms for accomplishing this goal; but
lawyers will not understand those mechanisms well unless they see
that money itself is not fungible.
9. The difficulty, outside of markets, of mapping normative judgments
onto dollars.
Often the legal system requires judges or juries to make
judgments of some kind and then to translate those judgments into
dollar amounts. How does this translation take place? Can it be
done well? Research suggests that in many contexts, normative
judgments of a sort are both predictable and nonarbitrary.60 With
respect to bad behavior that might produce punitive damages, for
example, people come up with relatively uniform judgments on a
bounded numerical scale. Similar findings have been made for envi60 See Kahneman & Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay For
Public Goods, 9 J Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1995); Sunstein, Kahneman, and
Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with notes on cognition and valuation in
law), forthcoming. The latter paper, based on 900 subjects, discusses computer
construction of 120 million juries, including (for example) all-white juries, allmale juries, all-poor juries, all-female juries, all-Hispanic juries, well-educated
juries, poorly-educated juries. It finds that these disparate juries reach similar conclusions about outrageousness and appropriate punishment on a bounded numerical
scale of 1 to 6. The story is much more complex for an unbounded dollar scale;
here there is much arbitrariness.
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ronmental amenities in the context of contingent valuation.61 But
the act of mapping those normative judgments onto an unbounded
dollar scale produces considerable “noise” and arbitrariness. When
people are asked how much they are willing to pay to protect 2,000
birds, or how much a defendant should be punished for reckless
conduct leading to personal injury, the numbers they generate seem
to be stabs in the dark. The legal system, however, frequently relies
on just those stabs. Thus the awards of damages for libel, sexual
harassment, and pain and suffering are infected by severe difficulties,
as is the award of punitive damages in general. An understanding of
those difficulties may well lead to concrete reform proposals. Perhaps
the “mapping” can occur by a legislative or regulatory body that decides, in advance, how a normative judgment made by a bounded
numerical scale can be translated into dollars.
❆❆❆❆
This essay is at most a sketch. A large question involves the extent to which education can counteract cognitive and motivational
distortions, so as to eliminate some of the effects described above.62
With all the recent advances, behavioral research remains in an early
stage. There is much to learn. An understanding of its implications
for questions of law and policy will take a long time. Let’s go to
work.

61 See Kahneman and Ritov, supra note 60.
62Some of these effects, such as a taste for

fairness, should not be characterized as distortions; on the contrary, such tastes may help prevent prisoners’
dilemmas. See Robert Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit
Cooperation?, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 159 (1993).
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